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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the issue of foreign policy, border management, and border-
crossing incidents during Song-Liao peacetime (1005-1122). It focuses on one of the 
earliest borderlines drawn between two great powers of northeast Asia in the eleventh 
century, the Liao and the Song. This thesis not only traces its origin, establishment, and 
maintenance, it also spotlights a specific phenomenon of border-crossing, by generals 
and officials as well as commoners. By focusing on these border-crossing incidents and 
their repercussions in government, sometimes at decision-making level, this thesis tries 
to portray a more detailed and accurate of the Song-Liao border, and explore the 
importance impact of various issues happened in borderlands to Song policies. 
Based on officials records, literary collections of literati, memorials by officials, 
and travelogues written by envoys, this thesis addresses several questions: How was 
the border between the Song and the Liao established in the first place? Ever since its 
establishment, how did both states stabilize and maintain the border? What were the 
developments of previously existed diplomatic practices? What were the new 
developments stimulated by this freshly inaugurated border? Were the perceptions and 
understandings of the border the same according to different people ranging from 
emperors to farmers, from generals to soldiers, from people of the Song and those of the 
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Liao? How did the government react to intentional and unintentional border-crossings? 
And what roles did those reactions play in the making of foreign policies? 
This thesis demonstrates that with the signing of the Treaty of Chanyuan, a 
borderline that demarcated the territories of the Liao and the Song was immediately 
established. Various diplomatic institutions, regulations, and practices were 
subsequently inaugurated after the treaty was signed. These institutions and 
regulations, at different levels came to regulate various aspects of borderland issues 
such as routine administrative matters, espionage, trade, blockade of manuscripts and 
printed books, etc. This thesis also highlights a particular phenomenon of border-
crossing incidents which offers us a chance to see how the border was actually 
conceived and maintained in the eleventh century. The handlings of these incidents, 
when occasionally radical and unconventional, caused significant reverberations both at 
the local and central levels. These reactions mirrored the mentalities of Song foreign 
policy makers when dealing with border and territory issues. They also served as a 
point of departure for future policy-making. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Two contradictory assumptions concerning borders are often taken for granted in 
the modern cartography. On the one hand, a borderline that clearly demarcates the 
territories of two states is generally accepted as a modern invention peculiar to the 
nation-states. On the other hand, cartographers, without much hesitation, use 
borderlines on every map to delineate territories of ancient and medieval geopolitical 
entities that existed long before the time they claim appropriate to use those lines.  
These two assumptions have been challenged by recent scholarship on China in 
the eleventh century. Historians’ inquiries into the Chanyuan Treaty ???? show 
that the idea of a borderline, however vaguely it may be understood, already appeared 
as early as the eleventh century between the Song ? and the Liao ?.1 A substantial part 
of the treaty was about delineating and sustaining a specific border. Similar territorial 
delineations, copying the pattern of the Song-Liao borderline, were also visible between 
the Song and the Xi Xia ??, and between the Song and the Jin ?. Nicolas Tackett’s 
article on the Great Wall and conceptualization of the border astutely questions the 
assumption that “date the emergence of precisely demarcated borderlines, ‘border 
																																								 																				
1 Naomi Standen, Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2007), 25; Tao Jinsheng ???, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations (Tuscon: The 
University of Arizona Press, 1988), 10-24. Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao guanxi shi yanjiu ??????? 
(Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1984): 24, 101. And Ge Zhaoguang ???, Zhai zi Zhongguo ?
??? (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), 48-49. 
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consciousness’, territorial sovereignty and strictly-defined notions of the ‘geo-body’ to 
post-Westphalian Europe or post-seventeenth-century Eurasia.”2 Yet how was this 
borderline constructed, understood, and maintained a thousand years ago remains a 
question to be answered. 
Even modern states equipped with high technology and backed by massive 
budgets cannot afford to build a physical wall to separate the territories or segregate 
their peoples. Moreover, modern states are still suffering from problems like illegal 
immigrantion, smuggling, unpermitted trespassing of borders. Naturally, one may 
easily cast doubts on how effective an eleventh-century border could be in terms of 
preventing and solving these problems. For instance, in the Treaty of Chanyuan, we see 
agreements such as (1) both sides should repatriate fugitives, and (2) neither side 
should disturb the farmland and crop of the other.3 Was there any real guarantee that 
those terms would be implemented? Or were they merely terms on paper and hardly 
made any difference comparing with earlier periods? This thesis tries to recapture the 
actual condition of the border. More importantly, it tackles the question of how this 
																																								 																				
2 Nicolas Tackett, “The Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border Under the Northern Song,” 
Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 38 (2008): 103. 
3 The complete treaty is transcribed in Li Tao ??, Xu zizhi tongjian changbian ??????? 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985) [henceforth XCB], 1299; Two English summaries of the agreements 
in this treaty see Tao Jinsheng, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations, 15. And Naomi 
Standen, Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China, 25. 
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border was defined and conceived by different agents, the Song government, the Liao 
government, and their borderland populations. 
Scholars who study the Song-Liao relation have addressed some of the issues 
relating to the border. One of the pioneering Song-Liao relation scholars in United 
States Tao Jinsheng ???, when discussing Wang Anshi’s view of Song foreign policy, 
briefly discussed Wang’s attitude towards Song-Liao border disputes that happened in 
1072-1073 and 1074-1076?4 In a more recent collection of essays, he analyzed the 1074-
1076 dispute again by looking specifically into its negotiation process.5 Tao has also 
explored the role of a particular borderland prefecture Xiongzhou ?? played in Song-
Liao relation.6 
One of the other pioneering works about the Song-Liao border is Naomi Standen’s 
Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China.7 Standen’s book primarily looks at 
border-crossing cases in the ninth century China. Her book defines and distinguishes 
border-related concepts such as border, boundary, frontier, and loyalty. Several cases of 
border-crossing by military commanders dating from the Five Dynasties to the pre-
Chanyuan era are also analyzed. Her book takes a completely political perspective and 
																																								 																				
4 Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, 68-78. See also Tao, Song Liao guanxi shi yanjiu, 131-167. 
5 Tao Jinsheng, Song Liao Jin shi luncong ?????? (Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 2013), 227-
237. 
6 Tao, Song Liao Jin shi luncong, 183-200. 
7 Standen, Unbounded Loyalty. 
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argues that the border was mostly determined by individual allegiances of powerful 
generals during the tenth-century. 
Nicolas Tackett’s essay “The Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border 
under the Northern Song” is another important work that draws connection between 
the remains of the Great Wall and the Song-Liao border. It explores Song encounters 
with the wall, the use of the Great wall in demarcating the border. It also causes doubts 
to “tributary model” and question the dating of border lines.8 His study, like Standen’s, 
also takes the political perspective and focuses on literati’s conceptualization of the 
border. 
Shiba Yoshinobu ????, in his survey about Song foreign trade, briefly covers 
the role of Quechang markets in Song’s trade with the Liao.9  
Some Chinese researches on the Song-Liao border pick a specific area called dual-
tax-region ??? and its residents there ???.10 Other works occasionally mention the 
border-related issues when discussing the impact of the Chanyuan Treaty.11 
																																								 																				
8 Tackett, “The Great Wall under the Northern Song.” 
9 Shiba Yoshinobu, “Sung Foreign Trade: Its Scope and Organization,” in Morris Rossabi, eds., China 
among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th centuries (Berkely: University of 
California Press, 1983), 89-115. 
10 See An Guolou ???, “Song Liao bianjing de ‘liangshu hu’ ?????“???”,” Zhongguo shi 
yanjiu ?????, no.4 (1991): 149-153. See also Li Changxian ???, “Bei Song Hebei Xiongzhou 
de liangshu di ??????????,” Nanjing daxue xuebao ??????, no.3 (1993): 116-118. 
11 See Zhang Xiqing ??? et al., Chanyuan zhi meng xin lun ?????? (Shanghai: Shanghai 
renmin chubanshe, 2007). See also Lin Ronggui ???, “Bei Song yu Liao de bianjiang jinglue ??
???????,” Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu ???????? 10, no.1 (2000):24-26. 
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All these studies reveal some truth about the border, but can by no means offer us 
a holistic picture of how the border was truly operated on a daily basis since they either 
splinter one certain area or prefecture from the rest of the borderlands. In addition, 
there can be more than one single political perspective to observe the border. This thesis 
intends to close these gaps by situating the Song-Liao border in the central positon and 
studying it as the primary subject-matter. One ambition of this study is to unveil how 
borderland population were affected by new border institutions and practices and how 
they responded. 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of 
previous scholarship on the Song-Liao border. It then points out some of the overlooked 
and less studied issues concerning the border. These remaining issues are the focus of 
this thesis. Chapter two reexamines the significance of the Chanyuan Treaty, which 
reshape the geo-political structure of China in the eleventh century, with special 
attention to the agreements regarding the border and their immediate effects. Chapter 
three concentrates on new institutions and practices that maintained and stabilized the 
border, including the re-introduction of markets, the blockade of books, and espionage 
activities. Chapter four depicts a more complex picture of the eleventh century Song-
Liao border by discussing a specific phenomenon of border-crossing. During the Song-
Liao peacetime, numbers of border-crossing incidents were recorded. Normally, these 
border-crossing incidents were handled by borderland officials with careful diplomacy; 
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however, sometimes we also see radical and contentious actions taken that could 
potentially be explosive. Consequently, these actions transcend borderlands and led to 
discussions and debates at policy-making level. These debates not only mirrored the 
mentality of Song’s foreign policy makers when dealing with territory issues, but also 
served as a point of departure for future policy-making. Chapter five is the conclusive 
chapter that summarizes the new findings about the Song-Liao border and its position 
in Song-Liao relation. 
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Chapter Two: The Treaty of Chanyuan and the Establishment of the Song-Liao 
Border 
From the tenth to thirteenth century, viewing from the geo-political perspective, 
the East Asian world was a highly sophisticated one. Unlike the previous Sui-Tang 
period in which China was more or less a vast and unified empire that dominated the 
area, several regimes emerged on the stage in these centuries. The Liao (Khitans), the 
Song, the Xi Xia (Tanguts), the Jin (Jurchens), the Goryeo (also spell as Koryŏ), the Dali 
?? , and the Jiaozhi ??were all vital states. Therefore, a previously wide-accepted 
model of tributary system in which China was the center of all civilizations was astutely 
disputed by scholars who specialized in these centuries. As the title of the book “China 
among Equals”aptly suggests, the Song was a “lesser empire” that was no longer 
superior to its neighbors.12  
Actually, this is not merely the opinion of modern scholars, even Song people 
themselves sensed that their position with neighbors had altered dramatically. The 
famous scholar-official Fu Bi once mentioned in his memorials to Emperor Renzong, 
Ever since the Khitans seized the north of Yan and Ji, and the Tanguts acquired 
the west of Ling and Xia, the talented people born there were used by them. 
They acquire China’s lands, mobilize Chinese human resources, assume 
Chinese titles, imitate Chinese institutions, employ Chinese talents, read 
Chinese books, use Chinese vehicles, proclaim Chinese laws; what these two 
																																								 																				
12 Rossabi, China among Equals, 47-65. 
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enemies do are all equal to China. But their formidable military forces and 
intrepid generals are stronger than those of China’s. What China has, they also 
have. And their advantages are what China lacks. We need to treat them as 
China’s nearest rivals, and then we may barely defend ourselves. How can we 
treat them as barbarians in ancient times?  
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????13  
 
This was the position held by some open-minded scholar-officials. Many more 
expressed a similar attitude privately when they discussed foreign affairs, especially 
when they were addressing to the Liao, with their colleagues and friends. In the sense 
of being “equal”, compared to other states, with the exception of the Jin, the Liao was 
certainly more equal than the others. Both Tao Jinsheng and David C. Wright 
repeatedly use the phrase “diplomatic parity” to describe the relation between the Song 
and the Liao. Tao Jinsheng describes the Song-Liao relation as “equal diplomatic 
relation”. He offers four major reasons for his view: 1) the establishment of a 
relationship of relatives between the monarchs and royal families of the two states; 2) 
the form of addressing each other as the “northern dynasty” and “southern dynasty”; 3) 
																																								 																				
13 XCB, 3640-3641. 
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equal diplomatic rituals; 4) an equal trading relation different from the tributary 
system.14 Wright also noted that “it is now generally recognized that Sung (A.D. 960-
1279) diplomacy with Liao (915-1125) and Chin (1115-1234) was conducted on the basis 
of something approximating equality or diplomatic parity”; however, he followed with 
a caveat that “the concept of an entire international community of equally sovereign 
and independent states did not exist in East Asia during Sung times. Northern Sung 
China did not see itself as one state among many equals but as a state with only one 
equal: Liao.”15 
An unprecedented equal relation between the Song and the Liao is the 
characteristic of the era. The parity was directly inaugurated by the Treaty of 
Chanyuan. The signing of the treaty was the foundation stone of the peacetime that 
lasted for more than a hundred years. The border between the Song and the Liao was 
an immediate production of the treaty. Before discussing the border-related treaty 
details, it is worthwhile that we reflect briefly on the pre-Chanyuan Song-Liao relation 
in order to see how borderland populations’ life changed before and after an official 
border was established.  
 
																																								 																				
14 Tao, Song Liao guanxi shi yanjiu, 41-42. Tao restates his opinion in his recently published collection 
of essays and situates the Song-Liao parity in an East Asian world that all states were seeking parity. 
See Tao, Song Liao Jin shi luncong, 91-132. 
15 David C. Wright, From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century China: Sung’s Foreign Relations 
with Khitan Liao (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 1-2. 
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Pre-Chanyuan Song-Liao Relation 
The Liao dynasty was established much earlier than the Song dynasty. In 907, 
Abaoji ??? became the Khagan of the Khitans. In 916, he ascended the throne and 
proclaimed himself as the Emperor. This year was generally accepted as the founding 
year of the Liao dynasty. 44 years later, Zhao Kuangyin ???, after a coup d’état, 
became the first emperor of the Song dynasty. Before the coexistence of the Liao and the 
Song, the Khitans kept an equal position with the Liang ?, the Tang ?, and the Zhou 
? in the Five Dynasties. The Jin ? and the Han ? were subordinate to the Liao. Since 
the establishment of the Song, Emperor Taizu ?? and his younger brother Emperor 
Taizong ?? focused more on conquering and unifying southern China instead of 
confronting their northern neighbor, the mighty regime of the Khitans. There were 
occasional frontier harassments between the Song and the Liao, yet a relative state of 
peace was maintained until 979 when a war erupted between the two states. Emperor 
Taizong was eager to recover the sixteen prefectures in the north. These northern lands 
were lost to the Liao in the Five Dynasties. In order to get support from the Liao for 
helping him defeat the Later Tang forces, Shi Jingtang ???, Emperor Gaozu of the 
Later Jin, gave away these strategically vital territories that traditionally within China 
proper and controlled by Han people to the Liao. Two utter defeats in 979 and 986 to 
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the northerners shattered Emperor Taizong’s ambition.16 These lands were not 
recovered by Han regimes until the Ming dynasty. 
Apart from military confrontations, the diplomatic relation between the Song and 
the Liao was commenced by borderland officials. Both the Song and the Liao claimed 
that it was the other side who first requested setting up a diplomatic relation.17 A letter 
from the Zhuozhou ?? prefecture magistrate Yelü Cong ??? may have initiated it, 
Cong received the benevolence from our emperor, humbly served as a 
borderland official. If I did not establish a formal relation with the foreign 
nation, then my words would be inappropriate. If things can be beneficial to 
one’s nation, it is good to act with authorization. I reflect that the south and the 
north was similar in the past and at the present. When have we not enjoyed a 
happy alliance, and exchanged presents? In the past, the monarch of the Later 
Jin was weak, confused by strong officials, and forgot the great righteousness. 
weapons have been used on daily basis, human lives hence suffered disasters. 
Now our two states have no previous quarrels. If either side sends out an envoy 
to convey the intentions of the two emperors, to rest our tired people, to rebuild 
a friendly relation, to be long lasting allies. Is that not wonderful!  
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
																																								 																				
16 A thorough scrutiny of the Song-Liao war see Zeng Ruilong ???, Jinglüe You Yan: Song Liao 
zhanzheng junshi zainan de zhanlüe fenxi  ????: ????????????? (Hong Kong: 
Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 2003). 
17 Tao, Song Liao guanxi shi yanjiu, 19-20. 
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???????????????????????????????????
??!18 
 
For the following several years, both the Song and the Liao sent out envoys to 
convey good wishes on festivals, express condolence upon the death of an emperor, 
empress, or empress dowager, or to inform and congratulate on a new emperor’s 
accession. However, these friendly diplomatic gestures were interrupted by the military 
campaigns launched by Emperor Taizong in 979. A formal diplomatic relation was not 
restored until the Treaty of Chanyuan.  
Trade between the Song and the Liao did not resemble their diplomatic relation. 
Unlike warfare that interrupted formal diplomatic relation, trade continued even when 
the Song and the Liao were in the state of war. Formal trade, rather than smuggling 
which bound to be happening all the time, regulated by government and conducted in 
markets that located in Zhenzhou ??, Yizhou ??, Xiongzhou ??, Bazhou ??, 
and Cangzhou ?? five prefectures started from 977.19 After 979 the war broke out, five 
trades continued intermittently.20 Government regulated trade conducted in Quechang 
??markets, like diplomatic relations, need to wait the Chanyuan treaty for its re-
establishment. 
																																								 																				
18 Xu Song ?? eds., Song huiyao jigao ????? (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2014) 
[henceforth SHYJG], 9711. 
19 XCB, 402. 
20 Tao, Song Liao guanxi shi yanjiu, 22. 
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Border relations in pre-Chanyuan era went through several stages. These stages 
are by no means exclusive but highly overlapping. Naomi Standen’s pioneering book 
Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China studies the Liao border from the early 
tenth century to early eleventh century, with an emphasis on the first half of the tenth 
century since most of the figures who crossed the frontier were active in the Five 
Dynasties period. It argues that “in the opening decades of the tenth century the 
existence of multiple political centers in our frontier zone favored a highly pragmatic 
approach to borders and loyalty”, “borders between regimes in the frontier zone were 
determined largely by the shifting and contingent allegiances of individual 
commanders and regional officials.”21 It was allegiances that defined the border rather 
than the other way around.  
However, this gradually changed with the re-unification of southern China by the 
Song so that a multistate system was replaced by a dual-state situation. More 
importantly, the Treaty of Chanyuan nailed the coffin of the previously less morally 
condemned side-changings which were ubiquitous in the Five Dynasties and early Song 
dynasty. Numerous records show that in the 970s, it was common for both sides (more 
records from the Song side due to extant sources) to accept fugitives, both commoners 
as well as people with posts like generals, officials, and soldiers who surrendered.22 On 
																																								 																				
21 Naomi Standen, Unbounded Loyalty, 172. 
22 SHYJG, 9713-9716. 
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the contrary, the handling of these fugitives altered drastically ever since the beginning 
of 1000s due to the Treaty of Chanyuan. Although the concept of a “border” always 
existed between states since there needs to be a territorial distinction between one 
regime and another, the connotation and function of the border had changed 
significantly. The pivotal turning point was the Treaty of Chanyuan, which I shall 
discussed in the next section and its influence on border in the following chapters. 
 
The Treaty of Chanyuan 
In 1004, eighteen years after their victory over the Song, the Liao launched a 
massive invasion led by the Empress Dowager Xiao ??? and Emperor Shengzong ?
?? Yelü Longxu ????. Their troops were said to be  200,000 strong. The troops 
swiftly penetrated Song territories and reached the outskirts of Chanyuan ?? 
(Chanzhou ??, modern Puyang ??), which was close to the Song capital Kaifeng ?
?. Due to the immediate threat posed by the Liao forces, most officials suggested 
Emperor Zhenzong ??? to move the capital since it was a city without natural 
barriers hence hard to defend; however, under the strong persuasion by Kou Zhun ??
, the emperor made a brave move to lead his army against the Liao himself. Encouraged 
by the presence of the Emperor and the killing of Liao commander Xiao Talin ??? by 
a crossbow shot, the morale of Song troops was significantly lifted. A decisive battle 
was on the verge of breaking out, however, both sides had reasons to avoid such a 
	  15 
battle.23 An agreement was achieved due to the mediation of Wang Jizhong ???, a 
previous Song general who surrendered to the Liao and gained trust from the Emperor, 
and the negotiation by Cao Liyong ???. The agreements were then turned into an 
affidavit which later known as the Treaty of Chanyuan. The complete treaty was 
preserved in Li Tao ??’s Xu zizhi tongjian changbian and given below in translation by 
David C. Wright: 
    On this the seventh, or ping-hsü day of the first half of the twelfth, or keng-
ch’en month of the inaugural year of the Ching-te reign period, the Emperor of 
Great Sung respectfully transmits [this] oath deposition to His Majesty the 
Emperor of the Khitan: 
    To abide together in sincere good faith and reverently uphold a joyous oath, 
of the resources had in natural abundance [in the Sung realm], 200,000 bolts of 
raw silk and 100,000 taels of silver [shall be forwarded] annually to assist with 
[Khitan] military expenditures. Moreover, envoys shall not be dispatched with 
the special duty of proceeding to the Northern Court [with these items]; the 
State Finance Commission shall simply be directed to dispatch personnel to 
transport [them] to Hsiung-Chou for delivery and dispensation. 
    The civilian and military prefectures along the border shall each abide by the 
[present] territorial boundaries. The residents and households of the two realms 
shall not encroach on one another. 
    If there are robbers or bandits who flee arrest, neither side shall allow them to 
be give refuge. 
																																								 																				
23 Many studies have discussed the pros and cons of continuing or not continuing the war. The most 
recent ones see three essays in Zhang, Chanyuan zhi meng xinlun, 1-12, 30-36, and 45-48. See also Yu 
Wei ??, Song Shi ?? (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe), 39-41.  
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    As for furrowed fields and sowing and reaping, neither the North nor the 
South shall grant [their populations] license to harass or disturb. 
    All walls and moats now in existence on either side may be kept and 
maintained as of old, with the dredging of moats and completion of repairs all 
as before, but it shall not be permissible to initiate construction on [new] walls 
and moats or open or dig [new] river channels. 
    Neither side shall make requests outside [this] oath deposition. We must 
work together so that [this oath] can endure far and long. Henceforth we shall 
preserve the peace for the worthies among the common people and carefully 
maintain the boundaries. This we pledge before the deities of heaven and earth 
and declare at the ancestral temples and to the spirits of the land and grain. 
[May] our posterity abide [by this oath] and transmit it in perpetuity. 
    Whosoever shall repudiate this oath shall be unable to enjoy the reign over 
[his] state, [for this oath is] clearly manifested [to all] and scrutinized by 
Heaven, which along with [the offended state] shall surely destroy him. 
    From a distance I have prepared [this document now] opened and spread 
[before you]. With singleness [of heart] I await your reply. I say no more.24 
 
???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
																																								 																				
24 Wright, From War to Diplomatic Parity, 74-75. 
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???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????25 
 
The number of essays and monographs on the Treaty of Chanyuan, according to 
some estimates, has reached almost 200.26 These studies approach the treaty from 
various perspectives. Some pay more attention to the military confrontations happened 
before the treaty was signed. Others study the process of peace negotiation, focus on the 
questions like which side first prompted up with the idea of negotiation instead of a 
decisive battle, or who were the key figures to make the negotiation possible. Other 
than pre-treaty activities, numerous researches touch on the impact and influence of the 
annual payment on the Song, the Liao, and future foreign relations. The border itself 
seems to be an understudied subject. 
 
The Establishment of the Song-Liao Border 
If we look at the treaty again, apart from the rituals and formalities, the main body 
of the treaty can be divided into two parts. One is about the annual payment that the 
Song is obliged to deliver. The other is about drawing borderlines and territorial 
demarcations. As for the second part, the treaty (1) formally established and 
consolidated a border that demarcated the territories of the two states; (2) regulated that 
																																								 																				
25 XCB, 1299. 
26 See the catalog in Zhang, Chanyuan zhi meng xinlun, 452-467. 
	  18 
it was each side’s duty to repatriate fugitives; (3) prohibited the disturbance of 
farmland; (4) forbade new constructions of fortifications and canals other than the ones 
that already existed. Just as many other rules made in pre-modern societies, in theory, 
they were perfectly designed; however, due to various reasons, in practice they were 
not effective as they appeared on paper. As we shall see, during peacetime, 
innumerable cases of violation were recorded in sources regarding these four aspects. 
Both the central government and the borderland local government were forced to deal 
with these incidents. But before moving onto a thorough scrutiny of borderland 
incidences, it is worth examining the immediate impact of the treaty on territorial 
demarcations. 
Three months after the treaty was signed, a report was sent to Xiongzhou 
prefecture ?? from the local government of Rongcheng county ???. The report said 
that the Khitans had crossed the border river the Juma River ???, and their chief 
asked for grasslands to graze.27 Emperor Zhenzong replied, 
There were many dual-tax-payers (those who pay taxes to both the Song and 
the Liao) households within the forty li between the Juma River and the 
Xiongzhou prefecture; however, the river bridge was built by the Xiongzhou 
prefecture, and the border marker has always been there, how can [these 
Khitans] cross the river and graze? They must rely on the fact the two states 
have made peace, and consider that there is no boundary. [We] can 
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immediately order the border officials to prepare diplomatic documents, list the 
words on the treaty, let the Khitan chiefs know them, and reprimand them. 
Moreover, it is now the beginning of a friendly relation therefore more 
necessary to abide by rules rigorously. It must not be delayed. 
???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????28 
 
From the emperor’s response, we know that at least in Xiongzhou prefecture there 
were already border markers and copies of the treaty stored by local government so 
that when necessary they could show the violators the treaty provisions. From another 
case happened three months later, we know that the Liao also treated the border 
seriously. They sent diplomatic documents asking the Dingzhou prefecture to prohibit 
its people from crossing border and felling timber in Liao’s territory. More interesting 
was the reaction from the Song government. After receiving documents from the Liao, 
Song local officials went to the place where border-crossings took place with the 
loggers, and set up border markers to inform them of the message. Along with them 
were border officials from the Liao side.29 We can know from these cases that from the 
beginning of peacetime, both sides were starting to set up border markers at places 
where no natural barriers like rivers and mountains existed and inform their people not 
																																								 																				
28 XCB, 1325. 
29 XCB, 1347. 
	  20 
to cross the border. Due to the fragmented nature of extant sources, it is hard to prove 
firmly that these activities were incessant ones, however, it is reasonable to believe that 
ever since the signing of the treaty both sides took great effort to establish and 
consolidate a mutually respected border. 
 
 
Figure 1 Map of important prefectures at the Song-Liao border. 
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Chapter Three: New Institutions and Practices at the Song-Liao Border 
Since the formal establishment of the Song-Liao border, many new institutions or 
old institutions with new responsibilities emerged to meet the need of a new era of 
Song-Liao relation. These changes were undertaken to achieve three objectives, (1) to set 
up a routine administrative system to deal with various issues and incidents at 
borderlands; (2) to re-establish and regulate the trade between the two states; (3) to 
consolidate and stabilize the borderlands.  
A new Song administrative institution for dealing specifically with Liao is called 
the “Office of Diplomatic Correspondence” guoxin suo ???. This office was 
established in August 1007.30 It was both a central and local institution.31 It oversaw the 
sending and receiving of diplomatic documents. It was also responsible for supervising 
the delivery of annual payments.  
Three types of documents were invented to cope with different occasions in Song-
Liao relation. The first type is affidavit or oath-deposition like the Treaty of Chanyuan, 
and later the Treaty of Qinli ???? or Guannan ????. The second type is called 
“national letter ??”, oftentimes used for conveying good wishes on festivals, 
celebrating birthdays, or expressing condolences. The third type is called “regular 
diplomatic document?”, which was most frequently used when dealing with foreign 
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affairs. “Regular diplomatic documents” were used in (1) negotiating the delineation of 
border; (2) handling border-crossing incidents; (3) handling newly constructed 
fortifications; (4) handling smuggling business; and (5) mediating legal disputes.32 
The Song also set forth a preferential treatment for borderland civil service 
examinees to win the support of people who lived in the Song borderlands therefore 
consolidate its governance over borderlands. Borderland examinees were exonerated 
from prefectural level exams. There were also extra examination sites and other 
privileges for borderland examinees.33 
Some of these institutions were born from the beginning of peacetime, for 
instance, new government-supervised markets were set up to accommodate the 
growing need for trade and to prevent smuggling. Some were gradually invented to 
resolve new problems such as prohibiting the export of books, or the alteration of civil 
service examination standards to accommodate the need of borderland examinees. 
Apart from the previously mentioned institutions, this chapter focuses on some less 
discussed, but equally important if not more, borderland institutions to see how the 
Song-Liao border was routinely administrated and operated. Besides institutional 
changes, these new phenomena also reflect the reshaping of ideas and mentalities of the 
time. 
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Quechang Markets and Smuggling in Borderlands 
Our discussion opens with the re-establishment of government-supervised 
markets, the Quechang. As introduced in the last chapter, trade between the Song and 
the Liao people was a continuous one, even during the war times. During Emperor 
Taizu’s regime (960-976), the people of the Song and the Liao already did business with 
each other. But it was not until Emperor Tazong’s regime (976-997) that regulating 
institutions were set up by government. Five markets in Zhenzhou ??, Yizhou ??, 
Xiongzhou ??, Bazhou ??, and Cangzhou ?? refectures were built up during the 
Emperor Taizong’s regime. The products exchanged were mainly spice, rhinoceros’ 
horns, ivories, and tea.34  
Horses were also among the merchandise list, though usually was the Song that 
bought horses from the Liao.35 Due to the sensitive nature of horses as a resource for 
warfare, the Khitans were reluctant to trade horses. They have once requested to 
prohibit any more horse trading yet was rejected. As a retaliatory action, the Khitans 
plundered the tents that located west of Fengzhou prefecture ??.36 During the war 
period, Quechang markets were closed, however, private trading between commoners 
and smuggling business still existed.  
																																								 																				
34 XCB, 402. 
35 XCB, 471. 
36 XCB, 479. 
	  24 
Surprisingly, the Treaty of Chanyuan itself did not contain any agreements or 
regulations concerning inter-state trade. But not before long after the two states signed 
the treaty, on March 15th, 1005, the Song government reopened the markets in 
Xiongzhou, Bazhou, and Ansu prefectures ???.37 They also sent diplomatic 
documents to the Liao stating that trading should be done in these markets and these 
markets only. The Song government adopted strict regulations on what may or may not 
be traded. On May 1st, various types of silk were banned from trading.38  
Apart from silk, books that are not the nine Classics or the annotation on the nine 
Classics were also banned39. This was one of the earliest ban of exporting books 
recorded in the sources. As we shall see later in this chapter, the blockade of 
manuscripts and published books was a disparate phenomenon compared to earlier 
times. Nonetheless, Quechang markets were effective venues for the two states to trade, 
and more importantly to collect taxes. Therefore, more and more Quechang markets 
were established throughout the peacetime including Guangxin prefecture ???40, 
Huoshan prefecture ???, Jiuliangjin ??? (???), Xincheng ??, and Dong 
piantou village ???? (the latter two were in Liao’s territory and administrated by 
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the LiAO).41 Goods that were bought and sold in these Quechang markets had also 
greatly expanded. Jewelries, silver, tin, copper coins, ginger, alum, and sackcloth were 
also on trading lists. Aside from text sources, archeological findings also reveal that 
Ding kiln porcelains were among the merchandises traded in Quechang markets.42 The 
amount and value of the items traded was astonishingly high. Therefore, many scholars 
estimate that most of the annual payment that the Song delivered to the Liao, through 
Quechang markets, returned to the Song.43 
In addition to Quechang markets, smuggling business was also thriving during 
peacetime. For the Song and the Liao government, Quechang markets were effective 
both in terms of exchanging goods and collecting taxes; however, for borderlands 
merchants, Quechang was more an obstacle for gaining profits rather than a beneficial 
channel. This is because the goods that could be legally traded at Quechang markets 
were limited while at the same time people from both states wished to trade more items 
hence gain as much profit as possible. Both inside markets and outside, people privately 
traded salt, books, and most importantly, tons and tons of copper coins. According to 
Su Zhe ??’s memorials, 
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We have observed that the North [Liao] does not have any currency, public and 
private trades, they all use copper coins of ours. Although the borderlands have 
rigorous laws to ban [the trade of copper] currencies; however, when there is 
profit [to gain] it is impossible to stop the trend. We forge millions of copper 
coins every year, but still worry about being lack of currency. This is because 
[all the currencies] are spread into foreign lands, then of course the trend is like 
this. 
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
?????44 
 
Quechang markets, due to their limited numbers and rigorous regulations on 
tradable merchandise, satisfied only partial needs of the borderland populations. The 
border and Quechang markets were de facto restrains to a bigger flow of trade. In 
addition, some borderland areas belonged to the same regime before the co-existence of 
the Song and the Liao. Borderlands population may spoke the same language, had the 
same custom, hence maintained frequent communication. In that case, smuggling 
business, driven and sustained by borderland populations’ need, was extremely 
difficult to prevent and existed throughout the peacetime that exceeds a hundred years 
between the Song and the Liao. 
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Blockade of Manuscripts and Printed Books 
As mentioned earlier, the Song government regulated that only the nine Classics 
and their annotations could legally be traded to the Liao in Quechang markets. This ban 
was reinstated in 1027, 
The merchants who are active in the Hebei borderland Quechang markets often 
carry the literary collections of our officials and sell them to foreign states. 
These collections recorded the information about gains and losses of the 
government, government institutions and borderland affairs. This is deeply 
troublesome. Therefore [we] ban it.  
???????????????????????????????????
?????????????45 
 
In 1078, Emperor Shenzong ??? announced again, after the first ban in 1006, 
that those who trade books other than Classics would be severely punished.46 In fact, if 
the books contain information about borderland intelligence, even people from friendly 
states like Koryŏ were prevented from getting them47. However, due to the almost 
unpreventable smuggling business, these bans had little real effect. From the Song 
envoy Su Zhe’s observation, we know that Song publications were imported into the 
Liao in enormous quantity: 
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All the writings that have been carved into woodblocks, according to my 
estimate, are all circulating in the north. When I first arrived at Yanjing, deputy 
guard commander Xin Xigu welcomed and saw me off, he ordered Yuanxin to 
pass words and ask me, “your brother Su Shi’s Meishan ji has arrived here for a 
long time, why not you also print your own literary collection and let it spread 
here?” When arriving at Zhongjing, minister of revenue Zheng Zhuan held a 
feast, and said to me that my father Sun Xun’s writings can thoroughly tell the 
ins and outs of a story. When I arrived in front of the tent, reception staff Wang 
Shiru said to me, “I have heard that you often consume fuling (wolfiporia 
extensa), may I ask about the recipe?” This is probably because I have written 
the Ode on Consuming Fuling and it has also been circulated in the north. We 
therefore anticipate that most of our published books are being circulated in the 
Liao. Among them, there are possibly a lot of memorials and essays on politics 
written by scholar-officials and literati that discuss the gains and losses of the 
government, pros and cons on military affairs. In addition, common people are 
foolish and vulgar, they care only about profit, [therefore] they print bantering 
and joking words everywhere. If we let these books spread all over the north, 
on the top level our secret will be leaked, at the bottom level we will be mocked 
and laughed by the barbarians, these [consequences] are extremely unideal.  
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
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???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????48 
 
Despite the continuous effort to prohibit books from being sold to foreign states, 
especially the Liao, records show that from the beginning of the peacetime to the end 
Song publications were ubiquitous in the Liao. The attempt to make the border as a 
barrier to block the spread and circulation of information and knowledge had utterly 
failed. However, it is worth contemplating why the Song government took these bans 
seriously. The military pressure felt by the Song literati were unprecedentedly heavy. In 
many cases, the Liao people managed to acquire sensitive information concerning Song 
government and military movement through these publications. For instance, in 1053, 
envoy Fu Yongyan ??? saw Song maps in Liao’s yams.49 It is potentially dangerous 
for the enemies, though in peacetime, to acquire too much confidential information so 
easily through book smuggling business. More importantly, it reflects a growing 
concern among Song literati about their civilization’s superiority being taken over by 
those they usually called barbarians. The policy of blocking exports of manuscripts and 
printed books was one enacted at the border; however, it also mirrored a growing 
concern in the Song literati’s mind that would later merge into their debates about 
orthodoxy and legitimacy. 
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Intelligence and Espionage 
Although the peacetime between Song and Liao lasted for almost a hundred and 
twenty years, both states never relaxed their vigilance against each other. Prohibition on 
exporting books was one phenomenon revealing the distrust and vigilance between the 
two states. Apart from printed books, another, and more direct way of acquiring 
intelligence was through espionage. The Song-Liao border, where diplomacies and 
trade took place, and a hodgepodge of different people congregated, was the front line 
for information battles.  
Institutions in charge of spying were set up in local borderland government. The 
Song government organized spies to secretly collect information from the north.50 The 
earliest government-organized spying can be dated back to 1010.51 For the spies and 
borderland officials, their mission was described as below: 
To acquire the information concerning the person in charge of military, their 
names, ability, characteristic, the number of soldiers that they command, their 
martial art skill, the location where forces station, the scale of fortresses, the 
amount of grain reserves, and the route forces march. When retried these 
information, [spies] should return and report them [to their superiors]. After 
comparing information from different spies, compile those that can be 
recognized as real into books, and prepare for using. Those border officials who 
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are incompetent [for doing these], especially those who sent spies and get false 
information, should be demoted.  
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????52 
 
We even know the exact number of people in charge of recruiting, organizing, and 
writing pay check to spies in each borderland prefecture. For instance, there were four 
in Guangxin ?? and Shun’an prefecture???, three in Xiongzhou and Beiping 
prefecture ???, seven in Bazhou, and six in Baozhou ?? and Ansu prefecture.53 
Usually the Song spies were embassy staffs or commoners. Noticeably, almost all the 
spies, no matter whom they worked for, the Song or the Liao, were local Han Chinese. 
Since the Khitan people had different hairstyles and clothing, hence could be easily 
recognized, it is natural for Han people to serve as spies.  
The reward for acquiring information about one thing was 2,000-3,000 wen. It 
seems that the reward for spotting and catching spies from the other side was much 
higher. In 1050, Zhang Yong ??, Zhang Xian ??, and Wang Sheng ?? caught the 
Liao spy, a dual-fax area resident54, Feng Jun ??. They were greatly rewarded and 
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appointed as officials. On the other hand, the Liao spy Feng was sentenced to death.55 
Like Feng Jun, most of the spies detected and caught by the opposing state were 
executed. In 1073, a Liao spy called Wang Qian ?? was beheaded, and his family was 
taken into custody in Tanzhou prefecture ??.56 Luckier were those who managed to 
escape before the exposure of their undercover identities, they were normally rewarded 
monetarily and appointed to a government post. In 1027, Zhang Wenzhi ??? 
fulfilled his job and return to Song, later he was appointed to an official.57 In 1054, Li 
Xiu ??, a commoner in Yizhou, was employed as a spy by the government of 
Xiongzhou prefecture. He was turned in by another Song borderland commoner who 
sneaked into Liao. Li somehow managed to escape before being caught. He was then 
granted a government post.58 Similar cases can be found throughout peacetime. From 
these cases, though lacking direct evidence, we may conclude that, at least for Song 
(very likely for Liao as well), a reward system designed for retired agents or exposed 
agents managed to escape has already been set up. The rewards consist of financial 
rewards, lands, and government posts. 
Both the Song and Liao spies took on various identities when carrying out their 
missions. Records show that some Song spies even managed to penetrate the 
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government. The above-mentioned Zhang Wenzhi was once appointed a government 
post in Liao’s court. Liang Qishi ??? has even taught Khitan princes the Classic of 
Odes and the Book of Documents.59 Another identity was monk. In 1054, the Liao sent 
people from Weizhou ??, Yingzhou ??, Wuzhou ??, and Shuozhou ?? 
prefectures to Wutai Mountain ??? to become Song monks in order to make secret 
enquiries. As a counter measure, Song government later required guarantors for anyone 
who wished to become a monk in borderlands.60 
The Song government quickly set up a new government department at the border 
to run its espionage activities. An institution that recruited, trained, organized, and 
rewarded spies was established. Although we do not know whether the Liao created its 
own spy system, due to limited sources, it is certain that they also sent spies to the Song 
territory. The information battle that took place at the border was an important new 
phenomenon which shows the continuing tension between the two states even in 
peacetime. 
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Chapter Four: Border-Crossing Incidents and Foreign Policies 
Border-Crossings Incidents 
In 1044, a Khitan consort prince called Liu Sangu ???, disgusted by his wife’s 
prurience, fled to the Song and hid in Dingzhou prefecture ??. The Liao officials sent 
several documents urging the Song government to return their consort prince. Ministers 
and advisors at court, including Ouyang Xiu ???, suggested that Song government 
should keep him in order to obtain confidential information about the Liao. However, 
Emperor Renzong ?? was persuaded by Du Yan ??’s argument of respecting the 
treaty. He decided to send Liu back.61 This is perhaps the most famous case of border-
crossing in the Northern Song, involving a distinguished imperial consort prince and an 
eminent official.  
Ouyang Xiu’s view was not in the minority, in fact, many other ministers also 
suggested that Liu was a valuable source. The dispute over how to treat Liu reveals that 
the treaty agreement to repatriate fugitives, though held some currency here (after all 
Du Yan’s advice was taken by the Emperor), considered by many as a mere scrap of 
paper that bounds no one if pros exceeded cons. If such were the case for more 
“valuable” people, what can we know about more ordinary people, especially the 
borderland population, at the time?  
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Clearly Liu knowingly fled to the Song territory to escape the jurisdiction and 
authority of the Liao. He had even reached out and established an unofficial 
relationship with the local prefectural magistrate in Guangxin prefecture ???.62 This 
chapter categorizes border-crossing cases like this as intentional trespassing. 
Trespassers knew that a border separated the territories and political authorities. A 
conscious motive backed their border-crossing activities. Bandits and criminals who 
intended to run away from either side’s jurisdiction and their punishment, officials who 
changed their allegiance and sought protection from the other side, and spies who 
engaged in espionage all belong to this category.  
While there can be no doubt that these border-crossings deserve scholars’ 
attention, what this chapter emphasizes is unintentional trespassing. These ordinary 
people had neither served in the militia nor the government. From their cases of border-
crossing, we may find out how common borderland populations conceived the border. 
My argument is that although the Chanyuan treaty conspicuously drew a line between 
the territories of the Song and the Liao, a line most certainly recognized by officials, 
generals, and soldiers, and in most cases respected by them, ordinary border population 
who were driven by practical need oftentimes neglected and trespassed the border. 
Various activities were conducted on these lands, including grazing, logging, farming, 
fishing, hunting, opening shops and transporting salt on the border river ???. This 
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chapter presents some of the most representative cases; however, these were by no 
means the only cases during the long peacetime between the Song and the Liao. It is 
reasonable to imagine that those recorded border-crossing cases were only the tip of an 
iceberg for that many others were not detected, or not significantly enough to be even 
mentioned in official records. 
In 1005, the same year when the Chanyuan treaty was signed, the border 
prefecture Xiongzhou received reports from the Rongcheng county, stating that the 
Khitans were detected grazing south of the border river.63 As the first case observable in 
extant sources, there are several interesting facts worth noticing. First, a border marker 
had already existed along with the bridge across the border river, a clear evidence that 
not long after the treaty was signed, some signals were established to remind people 
from both sides of a territorial demarcation. Second, after receiving Xiongzhou’s report, 
the emperor gave a clear order to border officials that they ought to display copies of 
the treaty to those who violated it. Border officials obviously kept treaty copies at their 
local offices. The same year in June, Dingzhou prefecture received documents from the 
Liao, asking the Song border officials to regulate logging by the Song subjects within 
the Song’s territory.64 This issue was resolved by officials and loggers from both sides, 
the Song and the Liao, arriving at the scene and setting up border sign together. 
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Hunting was also among these unintentional border-crossings. Unlike cases mentioned 
above, this one was a rumor reported by Lu Wan ??, who speculated that that 
Khitans intended to hunt along the border river. Even though the emperor was not 
entirely convinced that the Khitans would contravene the agreements, he still decreed 
that if such a case should happen, border officials should send documents to the Liao, 
and request them to abide by the treaty.65  
Notably, these cases all happened within the year Chanyuan treaty was signed. 
Nonetheless, among many agreements of the treaty, the border was enforced rigorously 
from the beginning. Ways to deal with border-crossing incidents caused by ordinary 
people, at this stage, mainly consist of three responses: 1) sending border-crossers back 
to their own side; 2) clearer markers and signs at the border or copies of the treaty that 
served as a warning or reminder to avoid similar cases in future; and 3) official 
documents exchanged between border officials from both sides.66 A standard procedure 
to deal with border incidents gradually took shape and consolidated following the 
pattern inaugurated at the beginning of Song-Liao peacetime. 
If it was quite normal to see border-crossing incidents when the border was just 
introduced, did things change, especially as making clearer border markers by both oral 
and physical means was integrated into the solving formula, afterward? Cases 
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documented in the mid-11th century show persistent border-crossing by both Khitans 
and the Song subjects. In 1057, the Liao envoy Xiao Hu ?? accused farmers from 
Wuyang village ??? and Tianchi temple ??? for encroaching on the farmlands of 
the Liao. An investigation conducted by the Song proved that it was in fact the Liao 
farmers who encroached. Later the Song court sent a diplomat with maps and informed 
the complete story about the farmlands dispute.67 Although this is a rare case that was 
not solved by border officials but by the central government, it nonetheless showed that 
even fifty years later, these incidents were still happening, and the way to solve them 
remained unchanged. Five years later, the magistrate of prefecture Daizhou ?? Liu 
Yongnian ??? reported that the Khitans were logging in the Song territory, some 
even extended into mountains a dozen miles within the Song’s border.68  
Despite the persistent efforts by border officials for decades, trespassing by 
ordinary people still seemed to be inevitable. Due to the lack of details concerning each 
case, it is almost impossible to know the exact reason why the borderland population 
continuously trespassed borderlines; however, a reasonable guess is that borderland 
populations who did farming, grazing, logging, transporting and so forth to make a 
living were bound to trespass when there was no obvious border markers for them to 
identify the border. The gap between ministerial will and reality is a telling 
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phenomenon from which we may imagine and deduct what a pre-modern border 
looked like, especially when the concept of the border is less significant after the Song 
until the mid-18th century. 
 
A Standard Procedure and Radical Reactions 
As shown in some of the cases mentioned above, a standard formula already took 
its basic form. First, except for a few cases, border-crossing incidents by ordinary people 
were solved locally. Both the Song and the Liao border officials, after receiving reports, 
sent out clerks and sometimes small troops to persuade, chase back, or repatriate 
trespassers. Later, diplomatic documents were exchanged between borderland 
prefectures to inform the other side. There was no bloodshed and no quarrel in the 
borderlands, and little impact has caused outside the borderlands. These peaceful, 
careful, and perhaps most importantly uncontroversial treatments helped to ensure a 
peacetime that lasted nearly 120 years between the Song and the Liao. However, this 
picture was by no means an exclusive picture of the borderlands. Occasionally, some 
border officials took radical, controversial, and even revengeful actions against 
trespassers. In the case of logging in Daizhou, Liu Yongnian ordered an incineration of 
the forest frequently logged by the Khitans. When questioned by the Liao official to 
capture the culprits, Liu simply replied that the fire took place within the Song territory, 
	  40 
therefore, it was none of the Liao’s business.69 A tough response, yet the Khitans were 
unable to make any more protest. It seems that whether officials took a radical decision 
or not mostly depended on the individual personality since in another case of Liu took a 
similar approach. In 1065, when reports came in that the Khitans opened shops 
surpassing their territory, Liu appealed to the central government for the permission to 
send troops to declare sovereignty, a contradiction to routine treatment of similar case. 
Naturally, the request was rejected by the emperor.70  
It is hard to find out the emperor’s attitude towards Liu’s rather rash actions since 
commendation was given to Liu in 1062 while his request got rejected in 1065. A 
reasonable guess would be in the first case, the Khitans did not know for sure if it was 
Liu who sent people to burn the forest. Therefore, the allocation of responsibility was 
unclear. Furthermore, the fire did not result in any real casualty. In contrast, moving 
troops was always potentially explosive and could lead to unpredictable conflicts. The 
emperor was cautious not the intensify small disputes. Feeble though it might seem, the 
standard procedure was preferable in most cases. Nevertheless, the tension between a 
conservative, evasive way that avoided escalating an incident to a greater conflict, and 
an aggressive response that shows a stronger and tougher attitude towards 
encroachment always existed throughout the whole peacetime. This was best 
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demonstrated by the persistent dispute over fishing in the border river. This dispute 
offers us the opportunity to see how a minor incident at the border can arouse heated 
debates at court. It mirrored many Song scholar-officials’ standpoint on foreign policy. 
Debates caused by the dispute, in turn, shaped future policy making.   
 
Border River Fishing Incidents and Foreign Policy Debates 
Among all types of border-crossing incidents in the period, border river fishing 
was certainly the most frequent and well-documented one. According to the treaty, the 
Juma River is a natural demarcation of Song-Liao territories. Consequently, it is also 
called the border river. A year after the treaty was signed, in 1006, both the Song and 
the Liao put a ban on fishing in the border river. The Liao officials even punished its 
own subjects for violating the ban and informed the Song about their disposal.71 These 
bans were repeatedly promulgated; however, the situation drastically deteriorated 
because of an incident happened in 1061. As time passed, the Khitans gradually 
neglected the ban, many started to fish or reap reed along the border river. Some even 
transported salt from the estuary to its hinterlands. While former magistrates did 
nothing about these, the new border official Zhao Zi ?? took a surprising action to 
send soldiers to kill the Khitan fishermen and destroyed their ships.72 Regrettably, we 
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do not have sources from the Liao side to see how their border officials reacted to this 
rather bold action, except for their routine treatment of exchanging diplomatic 
document.73 What we do know with certainty is that such a case was severe enough to 
stir debate and reverberate at the Song court where foreign policy was made. 
Sima Guang ??? was among those who strongly opposed Zhao’s disposal of 
border incidents. In 1065, in a memorial sent to Emperor Yingzong ??, when 
discussing northern and northwest border threats, he criticized Zhao for his 
imprudence when dealing with “minor events at borderlands like fishing in the border 
river or cutting down willow trees south of the River Bai ??”74. Though Sima Guang 
by no means considered that minor incidents like this could directly trigger military 
conflicts, he did worry that actions like this (and getting rewards for doing so) might 
create a dangerous precedence that encouraged other border officials to follow.75 It was 
simply not worth jeopardizing the peaceful situation that lasted for over sixty years for 
displaying one’s ability or loyalty. No doubt this was the view of many other elder 
statesmen, for instance, Hu Su ?? expressed a similar viewpoint, “ever since Zhao Zi’s 
action, more and more conflicts happened between the Liao and us … this country has 
enjoyed peace for over a hundred years and maintained a peaceful relationship with its 
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enemy for more than sixty years … a routine exchange of  diplomatic documents is 
good enough, why bother employing military actions to deal with (small incidents)?”76 
Regardless of the intensified factional dispute at the time, many ministers all expressed 
similar opinions, for instance, Wang Anshi ???, Fu Bi ??, Han Qi ??, and Zeng 
Gongliang ???, who recommend the appointment of Zhao Zi in the first place, all 
advocated a pacificatory policy.77 Objections increased so much so that Peng Siyong ?
??, Tang Jie ??, and Yandu ?? impeached him.78 Curiously, against all the 
objections and ministers’ will, Zhao Zi was promoted and continued to serve as a 
border official in other borderland prefectures until his death. A puzzling decision was 
made at the end since in most other cases the emperor seemed to discourage 
contentious treatments of border-crossing incidents. The case was settled for Zhao Zi, 
however, the incidents of border river fishing continued to happen. In the fourth month 
of 1072, despite the bloodshed spilled by their predecessors, fishermen were again 
spotted on the border river. And imaginably, these incidents would continue to happen 
throughout the later decades of the peacetime. 
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Conclusion 
The scrutiny on various types of border-crossing incidents depicts a much more 
complicated picture of the border, theoretically rigorous, perhaps even “modern”, yet in 
reality often neglected by ordinary borderlands population. A standard procedure was 
developed and employed to deal with these incidents. Border officials from both sides 
handled disputes with caution. Nonetheless, there were always anomalies that broke 
the rule. This chapter pays special attention to the persistent disputes over border river 
fishing. They not only provide detailed examples of border-crossing incidents which 
reflect the real picture of the border, they also open a window on the Song emperors 
and ministers’ attitude and strategy of foreign policy.  
From the perspective of borderland populations, sometimes they were aware of 
the border because of border markers, government’s notices, or clear natural barriers 
like mountains, rivers, and marshes. Sometimes, the border was an imagined one that 
could hardly be perceived. Nonetheless, in both scenarios, borderland populations, due 
to economic reasons, crossed the border to conduct activities like farming, logging, 
grazing, and smuggling. And when border officials found out about these incidents, 
they had to deal with them. Therefore, we see a standard procedure was created, 
however, it was not always the choice made by some officials as they reacted more 
aggressively. At court, we see a tension between two opposing attitudes towards radical 
actions when dealing with border-crossing incidents. One was trying the best to aviod 
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conflicts, sometimes even at the price of small sacrifices. The other called for tougher, 
more aggressive, and controversial actions. The emperors seemed to keep a balance 
between these two disparate attitudes. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
In 1005, after an almost drawn military conflict, the Song and the Liao signed the 
monumental treaty known as the Treaty of Chanyuan. As a direct product of the treaty, 
the Song-Liao border came into effect. The previously loose and ambiguous 
demarcation of territories, sometimes even changeable according to shifting allegiance 
of powerful individuals such as military commanders, was replaced by a much more 
rigorous one that both the Song and the Liao sworn oaths to maintain. These oaths also 
served as rules that regulated how the border should function. In brief, fugitives must 
be repatriated, farmlands should not be encroached, and no new fortifications or canals 
can be built. Immediately after the signing of the treaty, both states made an effort to 
consolidate the border. 
Not before long, new institutions and practices to were invented to maintain the 
peace at the border. These innovations covered various issues that could happen in 
borderlands. The “Office of Diplomatic Correspondence” was established, both in the 
central government and along the border, to cope with the Liao. Three types of 
diplomatic documents were designed for communication in different occasions. In 
order to win the support and loyalty of borderland population, a preferential treatment 
for borderland civil service examinees was introduced by the Song. Throughout the 
peacetime, government-supervised Quechang markets for trade were re-opened. At the 
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same time, smuggling business also thrived since goods tradable in markets were 
strictly limited and regulated. 
Threatened by its northern neighbor, the Song government also initiated the 
blockade of books into the Liao. Only a small number of books were lawful to be export 
to the Liao, as well as other states. In fact, through smuggling business, Song books 
were found everywhere. In the Song court, an anxiety of losing its cultural superiority 
was raising. 
Despite of the relative peace between the Song and the Liao, the border was a 
silent battleground for intelligence. Both states established institutions to recruit and 
dispatch spies to acquire their opponent’s information. A corresponding reward system 
was created simultaneously. 
All the above-mentioned phenomena tell us that the border was at the same time 
“solid” and “permeable”; however, the most outstanding and telling phenomenon was 
the border-crossing incident. Driven by economic reasons and practical needs, the 
border was often neglected and trespassed by ordinary people. Border officials were 
responsible for handling these matters. When they occasionally took unconventional 
approach, the seemingly insignificant disturbances could possibly turn into issues for 
serious debates, henceforth had an impact on future policy making. 
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Abbreviations  
For complete bibliographic data on the following works, see the Bibliography.  
SHYJG  Xu Song, ed., Song huiyao jigao  
SS   Toghto et al., eds., Song shi 
XCB   Li Tao, Xu zizhi tongjian changbian 
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